It could be stated fairly that Japan was goaded into bombing Pearl Harbor in 1941 permitting the US to jump into WW2, something FDR needed to end the Depression. The US oil blockade was Japan’s major incentive; a mix of desperation and opportunism. Japan saw its economic lifeline threatened as it pursued imperial ambitions in Asia. The U.S. Pacific Fleet, stationed at Pearl Harbor, was a major obstacle to Japan’s plans to secure resource-rich Southeast Asia. With the U.S. focused on neutrality and Europe’s escalating war, Japan calculated that a decisive blow could neutralize American naval power long enough to consolidate its gains. The gamble was that a weakened U.S. response would buy Japan time.
Today, China faces a different but arguably analogous situation. U.S. naval forces are heavily committed in the Middle East, with ongoing operations against Iran-backed Houthis and broader efforts to stabilize the region. This concentration could limit immediate U.S. naval flexibility in the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile, Trump’s tariff policies - escalating to 125% or higher on Chinese goods - threaten China’s export-driven economy, which is already reeling from a real estate crisis, sluggish growth, and supply chain shifts as companies diversify away from China. Taiwan, a long-standing "core interest" for Beijing, remains a strategic prize: its control would break the First Island Chain, allowing China to project power across the Pacific and secure its maritime flanks.
Could China see this as an opportunity to reclaim Taiwan while the US is distracted with a fledgling administration, tariff turmoil and naval assets inconveniently deployed?
Like Japan in 1941, China might see a narrowing window of opportunity. If the U.S. is distracted and its regional naval presence diluted, Beijing could perceive this as a moment to act before American forces can fully reposition or before economic pressures further erode China’s capacity to sustain a military campaign.
Similarities to Pearl Harbor
1. Economic Pressure as a Catalyst: Japan faced resource strangulation; China faces tariff-induced economic strain and supply chain exodus. Both scenarios could push a power to act militarily to secure strategic goals before economic decline becomes debilitating.
2. U.S. Distraction: In 1941, the U.S. was focused on Europe and hesitant to fully engage in Asia. Today, Middle East commitments could delay a robust U.S. response to a Taiwan contingency, giving China a temporary edge.
3. Naval Power Disparity: Japan sought to neutralize the U.S. Pacific Fleet to avoid interference. China might calculate that with U.S. carriers and destroyers tied up elsewhere, its massive naval buildup around Taiwan—numerically the world’s largest navy—could overwhelm local defenses and deter a timely American counterstroke.
4. High-Stakes Gamble: Both moves hinge on a risky assumption—that the U.S. would lack the will or capacity to escalate fully in response, allowing the aggressor to consolidate gains.
Key Differences
1. Military Balance: Japan faced a U.S. Navy it could realistically damage with a surprise attack. China confronts a modern U.S. military with global reach, nuclear capabilities, and allies like Japan and Australia. Even with Middle East commitments, the U.S. maintains a carrier presence east of Taiwan and could surge forces over time.
2. Economic Interdependence: Japan’s economy was less integrated with the U.S. than China’s is today. A war over Taiwan would devastate global supply chains—especially semiconductors, where Taiwan dominates—harming China as much as its adversaries. This mutual vulnerability might deter Beijing where it didn’t deter Tokyo.
3. Geopolitical Stakes: Pearl Harbor was a tactical strike to enable a broader campaign. Taiwan’s seizure would be a strategic endgame for China, likely triggering a prolonged conflict with the U.S. and its Indo-Pacific partners, not a one-off operation.
4. Warning Time: Japan’s attack was a bolt from the blue. For America. China’s military buildup around Taiwan remains highly visible, with frequent live-fire exercises and bold incursions into Taiwan’s air defense zone. The U.S. and Taiwan have time to prepare, unlike in 1941.
China’s Strategic Calculus
China’s leaders, under Xi Jinping, have consistently signaled that reclaiming Taiwan is non-negotiable; force is an option if "peaceful reunification" fails. Current conditions could tempt Beijing:
U.S. Naval Dispersion: With assets in the Middle East, the U.S. might struggle to mass carriers and submarines quickly in the Taiwan Strait. China’s 340-ship navy, including amphibious forces and missile-heavy platforms, could exploit this gap.
Economic Desperation: A faltering economy might push Xi to rally nationalistic support through a decisive move on Taiwan, offsetting domestic discontent with a historic victory.
Tariff Leverage: Trump’s "China in a box" strategy could backfire if Beijing sees military action as a way to break out, forcing the U.S. to choose between economic escalation and military engagement.
However, China also faces restraints. A blockade or invasion would invite sanctions, alienate neutral powers, and risk a multi-front conflict with the U.S., Japan, and potentially others. Taiwan’s terrain and U.S.-supplied defenses (e.g., anti-ship missiles) make a quick victory uncertain. Unlike Japan, which underestimated U.S. resolve, China knows a Taiwan conflict could escalate to nuclear levels—a deterrent Japan didn’t face.
Pragmatic Assessment
Could China see this as the perfect opportunity? Possibly, if Xi believes the U.S. is too overstretched to intervene decisively and if domestic pressures demand bold action. A blockade—less costly than an invasion—might be the preferred option, aiming to coerce Taiwan without triggering an all-out war. Yet the risks are immense: economic collapse, global isolation, and a protracted U.S.-led counteroffensive. Japan misjudged America’s resilience; China might not repeat that error, given the U.S.’s demonstrated ability to pivot resources and rally allies.
Strategically, the parallel holds in the sense of a pressured power seizing a perceived moment of weakness. Pragmatically, though, China’s leaders likely recognize that a "little military interference" is a fleeting illusion—U.S. retaliation would come, even if delayed. The Pearl Harbor analogy fits as a cautionary tale: a bold strike might win the opening move but lose the war. China’s opportunity exists, but it’s a razor’s edge, not a clear shot.
What if China made a more nuanced i.e. 'stealth' move: infiltrating Taiwan, manufacturing a coup, severing US affiliations, and re-uniting with China? Without serious bloodshed, which makes China a sympathetic player on the world stage, sticks the US with difficult retaliation choices while China simultaneously captures the chip-making capital of the world. It’s a playbook that leans on subversion, influence, and political theater rather than brute force, but an approach China has honed in other contexts, like its Belt and Road diplomacy or Hong Kong’s gradual absorption.
Here’s How It Could Work
China could pursue a multi-pronged, covert strategy:
1. Infiltration and Influence: Leverage existing networks—business elites, political figures, or even organized crime (e.g., triads)—to cultivate a pro-Beijing faction within Taiwan. China already has experience with "United Front" tactics, infiltrating civil society and media to shape narratives, as seen in Hong Kong and diaspora communities.
2. Manufactured Crisis: Stage a political upheaval—perhaps a corruption scandal or economic collapse tied to U.S. "exploitation"—to discredit Taiwan’s pro-independence leadership. A "grassroots" movement, secretly backed by Beijing, could demand a referendum or leadership change under the guise of "national reconciliation."
3. Coup Execution: Install a puppet regime via a swift, bloodless takeover—think a palace coup rather than a military invasion. This could involve bribing key officials, co-opting the military, or hacking critical systems to paralyze resistance. The new regime declares "reunification" as a sovereign choice, citing historical unity.
4. Information Warfare: Flood global media with a narrative of Taiwan "choosing" China, framing it as decolonization from U.S. influence. Disinformation campaigns could muddy the waters, casting doubt on any evidence of Beijing’s hand.
The goal: present the world with a fait accompli—a Taiwan realigned with China, no shots fired, and the U.S. left scrambling to respond without a clear casus belli.
Strategic Gains for China
Chip Dominance: Capturing Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and its ecosystem intact would hand China the world’s semiconductor crown. With 60% of global chip production, Taiwan’s loss would cripple U.S. tech and defense industries while bolstering China’s.
Sympathetic Optics: A bloodless "reunification" could cast China as a patient unifier rather than an aggressor, especially if framed as a rejection of Western meddling. Neutral or non-aligned countries might hesitate to condemn it, splitting global opinion.
U.S. Hesitation: Without overt aggression, the U.S. would face a dilemma: intervene militarily and risk looking like the aggressor, or do nothing and lose Taiwan’s strategic buffer. Economic sanctions might follow, but their impact could be blunted if China secures TSMC’s output.
Feasibility Challenges
While this nuanced approach is certainly elegant, it’s a high-wire act with serious hurdles:
1. Taiwan’s Resilience: Taiwan’s democracy is robust, with a strong national identity—over 60% of its people identify as "Taiwanese" rather than "Chinese" per recent polls. Decades of anti-infiltration measures, including strict oversight of Chinese investment and influence, make deep penetration tricky. A coup would require near-perfect execution to avoid sparking mass protests or resistance.
2. Military Loyalty: Taiwan’s armed forces are staunchly pro-independence and trained to counter Chinese subversion. Flipping key commanders without detection would be a monumental task, and any misstep could trigger a major civil conflict, negating the "bloodless" premise.
3. U.S. Intelligence: The U.S. has significant ties with Taiwan’s security apparatus via the Taiwan Relations Act and real-time intelligence sharing. Signs of Chinese orchestration—financial trails, communications intercepts—could expose the plot early, prompting preemptive U.S. support or sanctions.
4. Global Skepticism: Even if bloodless, a sudden pro-China shift would strain credulity. Beijing’s track record—Hong Kong’s crackdown, Xinjiang’s repression—would fuel accusations of foul play. Sympathy might erode fast if evidence of coercion surfaces, as it inevitably would in a connected world.
World Stage Perception
Initially, China could gain sympathy from nations wary of U.S. hegemony—think Russia, parts of the Global South—by pitching this as a peaceful resolution to a historical schism. State media could spin it as "the Chinese people healing a colonial wound," contrasting it with Western military interventions. But the facade would be thin:
Chip Monopoly Concerns: Taiwan’s semiconductor dominance is a global lifeline. Countries like Japan, South Korea, and the EU would see China’s control as a threat, not a triumph, likely rallying behind U.S.-led countermeasures.
Hong Kong Precedent: The 2019-2020 protests and subsequent security law shattered illusions of Beijing honoring autonomy. A "coup" in Taiwan would be viewed through that lens—less a unification, more a takeover—alienating democracies.
U.S. Narrative Power: The U.S. would counter with its own framing: China as a manipulative bully undermining self-determination. With allies, it could isolate China diplomatically, even without immediate military action.
Pragmatic Outcome
A stealth coup could work tactically if China pulls off a flawless operation—silencing dissent, securing TSMC, and selling the story globally. The lack of bloodshed might delay a unified Western response, giving China time to entrench control. But strategically, it’s a gamble:
Short-Term Win: China gains Taiwan and its chips, weakens the U.S. position in Asia, and scores a propaganda coup.
Long-Term Backlash: Suspicion would mount, economic retaliation (e.g., tech export bans) would bite, and Taiwan’s population could get restless, requiring repression that unravels the "sympathetic" image.
Compared to a Pearl Harbor-style strike, this avoids immediate war but trades military risk for political fragility. The U.S. might not fire missiles, but it could cripple China’s economy and rally a coalition to choke its gains. China might capture the chip capital stealthily, yet find the world less sympathetic than hostile—less a masterstroke, more a Pyrrhic victory. The nuance could buy time, but not legitimacy.
The U.S. might not fire missiles, but it could cripple China’s economy and rally a coalition to choke its gain, but this is a serious 2-way street. If China dumped a large number of the US bonds - especially MBS - they hold, it could crush the anemic US real estate/mortgage business with escalating interest rates and assorted negative effects.
China’s Bond Leverage
China holds a massive chunk of U.S. debt—around $775 billion in U.S. Treasury securities as of late 2024, down from its peak but still significant. It also owns an unknown but substantial amount of MBS and other dollar-denominated assets through state-managed funds. If China orchestrated a stealth coup in Taiwan and faced U.S.-led economic retaliation (sanctions, tech bans, coalition pressure), dumping these holdings could be its retaliation.
Here’s how this could play out:
Treasury Sell-Off: Flooding the market with U.S. Treasuries would depress bond prices, pushing up yields and interest rates. The 10-year Treasury yield, a benchmark for mortgages and loans, could spike, raising borrowing costs across the U.S. economy.
MBS Impact: If China unloads MBS specifically, it could tank the mortgage market. These securities underpin U.S. real estate financing—higher yields would mean pricier mortgages, crashing home prices and stalling construction. Recall the 2008 financial crisis showed how fragile this sector can be.
Dollar Pressure: A mass sell-off might weaken confidence in the dollar, though China would need to coordinate with other holders (e.g., Japan, with $1.1 trillion in Treasuries) to truly destabilize it.
U.S. Vulnerability
The U.S. economy isn’t invincible here. A sudden interest rate surge could:
Clobber Real Estate: With 30-year mortgage rates already hovering near 7% in 2025, a jump to 9% or 10% would freeze home buying, tanking property values and hitting consumer wealth—about $50 trillion of which is tied to real estate.
Slam Growth: Higher borrowing costs would choke businesses, especially small firms reliant on credit, potentially tipping the U.S. into recession.
Federal Budget Strain: The U.S. government, with a $35 trillion debt, would face ballooning interest payments, forcing cuts or more borrowing in a vicious cycle.
China’s Self-Inflicted Wounds
But this is a double-edged sword—China would hurt itself too:
Dollar Holdings Devalue: Selling Treasuries and MBS at fire-sale prices would mean massive losses on China’s reserves, which are heavily dollar-based (over $3 trillion). It’s like burning your own savings to spite your rival.
Export Collapse: A U.S. recession would slash demand for Chinese goods—America is still China’s top export market, worth $500 billion annually. With tariffs already biting, this could devastate China’s economy further.
Global Backlash: Dumping bonds could destabilize global markets, alienating neutral countries reliant on dollar stability (e.g., oil exporters). China’s image as a responsible power would take a hit, undermining its Taiwan narrative.
U.S. Countermeasures
The U.S. isn’t defenseless:
Federal Reserve Action: The Fed could buy up Treasuries and MBS to stabilize yields, as it did post-2008 with quantitative easing. Its balance sheet, already at $7 trillion, could absorb the shock, though at the cost of inflation risks.
Coalition Support: Allies like Japan and the EU, holding their own U.S. debt, might resist joining China’s sell-off, fearing mutual economic ruin. The U.S. could lean on this to dilute the impact.
Capital Controls: In extremis, the U.S. could freeze Chinese assets or restrict dollar transactions, hitting China’s ability to liquidate holdings without using back channels.
Strategic Balance
This economic brinkmanship is a game of chicken—both sides can inflict pain, but neither escapes unscathed. If China pulls off a Taiwan coup and the U.S. retaliates with sanctions, China could dump bonds to escalate. The U.S. real estate and mortgage sectors might buckle, with interest rates spiking 2-3% and home prices dropping 20% or more in a year. Yet China’s export-driven economy, already wobbly, could shrink by 5-10% as U.S. demand dries up, per some economist models.
The two-way street favors the U.S. slightly—its domestic market and Fed firepower give it resilience China lacks, given Beijing’s reliance on exports and foreign tech. But the collateral damage would be global: a 2025 version of 2008, with Taiwan’s chips as the prize and everyone else as losers. China might hurt the U.S. enough to blunt its coalition chokehold, but it’d be a Pyrrhic victory—capturing TSMC while torching its own economic stability. Neither side "wins" cleanly; it’s a stalemate of mutually assured disruption.
Neither side crashing means no immediate plunge into war or economic collapse, which spares the world a lot of pain. A tense standoff buys time: no Taiwan invasion, no U.S.-China shooting match, no global markets imploding from a bond dump or tariff spiral. People keep buying phones, chips keep flowing from TSMC, and the Middle East doesn’t get a new distraction to exploit.
For a while, it’s a breather—mankind dodges the bullet of a superpower slugfest. China gets to posture, Trump gets to growl, and both can claim “victory” to their bases. But it’s a fragile win; the underlying tensions don’t vanish. Taiwan’s status, chip control, and economic leverage stay powder kegs, ticking until the next provocation. Stalemate’s a reprieve, not a resolution—humanity catches its breath, but the game’s still on.
Maybe a stalemate is a Win for Mankind - for a while.
BW
Thanks to my military/intel buds who let me run this up the flag pole for their experienced observations, suggestions, and occasionally repressed laughter.
China needs Taiwan just the way it is. Lots of trade between China and Taiwan. The Chinese are interested in money, not land. It's a new world out there. America needs to wake up to it.
PS: Aircraft carriers are sitting ducks against the weapons of China and/or Russia.